THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS IN THE WORKS OF SOVIET AMERIKANISTS

Abstract

Since the 1960s, the Cuban Missile Crisis was considered the most dangerous event of the Cold War. However, in Soviet historiography there is only one article devoted entirely to the crisis. Furthermore, it explored the crisis within the narrow framework of American studies. Soviet historiography of the Cuban Missile Crisis presents a paradox. On the one hand, it declares the historical significance of the event. On the other, Soviet researchers did not study it in detail and barely mentioned it in their books. The article examines the discourse of the Cuban Missile Crisis in the popular books of Soviet Amerikanists, whose narratives were designed for a wide Soviet audience. To do this, the author examines the contexts in which the crisis was placed, i.e., the history of the United States, the post-war development of U.S. foreign policy, and the presidency of John F. Kennedy. The context of John F. Kennedy’s presidency is especially important since the president was a representative of American foreign policy. During the crisis, the young and energetic president becomes a hostage to his entourage that remains unnamed. The author explains such a contrast in descriptions of Kennedy through Alexei Yurchak’s theory of language and hypernormalization. The transformation of Kennedy’s image and the usage of ideological cliches as explanatory models, as well as the internal political and ideological context of the USSR, lead to the depersonalization of the Cuban Missile Crisis in Soviet historiography, which turned the crisis from the most important event of the Cold War into a “non-event.”